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I  am  sure it would be in Europe's  interest to have  a  European Monetary  System 
consisting of all nine  Community  countries.  But of course the terms  must be fair-
every prospective member  will rightly want to be  sure of that - and the system 
must  be  durable.  A successful  EMS  will help to create the conditions of monetary 
stability that are essential for the success of soundly based domestic  growth 
policies.  But  to be  successful the EMS  must  take  equal account of the interests 
of all prospective members  and must  be built on firm foundations. 
Ihope I  will be able to convince those of you who  have  serious doubts what  is 
being proposed and those who  are still trying to make  up their minds  that 
participation in a  viable  EMS  is in the interest of all the Member  States.  Nothing 
I  can  say will convince the professional anti-Europeans  and those who  in reality 
oppose the Government's  policy of making the  fight against inflation its main 
priority and who  will attack anything that serves  to reinforce monetary  di~lines  •.. 
The  countries of the European  Community  are particularly inter-dependent.  The  UK 
send  36%  of her total exports to other Member  States,  Germany  46%,  and France  51%. 
Moreover,  as  the  UK  is more  dependent  on  external trade than Germany,  or France, 
the share of its GDP  accounted for by  imports  from the rest of the  Community  is 
higher.  In 1977 the proportion was  10%,  compared with  9.7%  for Germany  and 
9.  2%  for  France. 
Thus  strictly on grounds  of national self interest every Member  State - Britain 
included - should look sympathetically at a  proposition,  such as EMS,  which is 
designed to shield the countries of Europe  from the worst effects of the  extreme 
fluctuations  in exchange rates  that have  arisen since the breakdown of the 
Bretton Woods  system,  and to provide a  basis  for effective coordination of 
national  economic  policies ...•. 
The  need to accompany  EMS  with appropriate national policies  implies obligations 
for both weak  and strong countries.  Inevitably these obligations will in one 
sense fall more  heavily on  the  former,  for the system will only endure if there 
is greater convergence than at present between the performance of the  Community's 
nine national  economies  and convergence  should obviously be towards  the standards 
of the best and not worst.  Nor  should the  stronger economies  have to bear the 
cost of others'  indiscipline.  But  of course  to aspire to  do  as well as the best in 
the fight  against inflation and  in response to their other economic  problems  ought 
to be  the weaker countries'  objective anyway. 
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I  must  stress that participation in  EMS  cannot be a  substitute for the 
political determination to carry out the national policies that are  needed 
to achieve these objectives.  But  the advantage of pursuing them within the 
framework  of EMS  is that this will give the weaker  economies  a  greater chance 
of securing complementary policies from the stronger countries than would 
otherwise be obtainable ..... 
But  having  looked at EMS  in terms  of the Community  as  a  whole,  I  would also 
like,  since this is a  British audienc·e,  to point out  some  of the consequences 
specirically for Britain of refusing to participate in a  viable system. 
Unfortunately it seems  unlikely that these would be restricted to the non-
enjoyment  of the benefits of joining.  It is  important not to be apocalyptic, 
but  there  is a  real danger that if Britain rejects or appears  to reject EMS 
in principle rather than because the details of the specific scheme  on offer 
are seriously inadequate then she will not merely miss  a  great opportunity, 
but will also substantially exacerbate her present national difficulties. 
First, because  such  a  stance could all too easily be interpreted at home  and 
abroad as  an  indication of unwillingness  on  the part of the Government 
genuinely to get to grips with Britain's economic  problems.  Since,  as  I  have 
said, membership or a  properly organised EMS  would require the government  to 
do  no  more  than to pursue the policies which are necessary anyway,  foreign 
investors,  currency market dealers,  and  domestic  management  and organised 
labour might well assume that voluntary non-membership  implied that the 
government lacked the necessary resolve - and they would act accordingly. 
Proving that it has this resolve might well prove harder outside EMS  than  ~n. 
Second,  because Britain's ability to influence major  decisions which proroundly 
affect her would be  reduced.  As  I  emphasised at the outset, Britain's economy 
is  now  intimately linked with its partners.  But if EMS  does  not  include all 
nine Member  States,  decisions concerning its management  will have to be taken 
outside the framework  of the Community's  institutions.  ·This could well mean 
that Britain would  have  no  effective  say in how  her partners manage  their 
respective currencies  either in relation to each  other or  in relation to 
currencies  outside the system,  including sterling. 
Non  participation might also diminish Britain's capacity to make  her views  felt 
in other areas  of Community  policy.  It is frankly difficult to assess the 
extent and  scale of this risk.  Community  level decisions outside the sphere 
of EMS  would continue to be taken within the  Community  framework.  This means 
that Britain would enjoy the same  legal rights  and  safeguards  concerning them 
as at present.  But  in my  view there  can be little doubt  that her unwillingness 
to undertake obligations which  others had accepted would in practice 
substantially reduce the readiness  of her partners to listen to Britain's views 
about  issues  such as  the need to reform the CAP  and to tackle the problem of 
perverse resource rlows. 
Of  course  EMS  may  fail,  and then those who  have  stayed out will look quite 
clever.  But the failure will do  nobody  any  good.  Success  on  the other hand 
could bring great economic  advantages.  I  must  however  stress yet again that to 
be  successful the scheme  must  take account  of the interests of all nine 
Member  States  and be both durable and  soundly based. 
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II. Fi"nancial Services 
It is not difficult to see that a  common  market,  in not  just banking but 
financial services generally,would benefit  from  a  European monetary system 
which over a  period of time resulted in the lowering of exchange control 
barriers and freer flows  of capital across  frontiers.  It is equally the 
case however that as the Community  moves  towards  a  freer monetary regime, 
it will become  not merely desirable, but  necessary to accompany  it with the 
necessary prudential mechanisms  some  of which  I  shall discuss later in 
this speech.  At  the same  time  the Commission's  aim is to try to avoid the 
creation of yet another Community  institution - say a  European Prudential 
Commission  since we  believe that this is not  necessary.  What  however 
will be necessary is the closest possible cooperation between supervisory 
authorities.  Such cooperation has  already begun:  the Commission  aims  to 
foster it still further so that as the Community  moves  towards  monetary 
union,  governments,  supervisors,  the  industry and the public  can have  the 
confidence that the security of the system appropriately matches  its 
growing  freedom. 
An  ambitious  aim you may  say.  But it is  not  new.  The  Treaty of Rome 
provides  for  freedom of financial service.  Yet,  twenty years after the 
Community's  creation,  progress  towards  freedom  in financial services lags 
far behind the  freedom  achieved in comparable areas  such as trade in goods, 
and relative ease of movement  of people within the Community.  But when  one 
stops to think,  it should be no  more  difficult for banks  or  insurance 
companies  to  set up  networks  of branches  throughout the Community  than for 
industrial undertakings to become  established throughout the Community  or 
people more  fully ..... 
1.  Why  coordination?  Wby  is this necessary? 
First, the banks  and  insurance  companies  in all the Member  States are 
becoming  increasingly international in scope.  Were  supervisory authorities 
to remain restricted to exercising control only within their national 
boundaries,  many  operations would escape their view altogether.  On  a  large 
scale this becomes  undesirable.  As  financial institutions become  inter-
national  so therefore  supervisory authorities must  follow their lead.  This 
in turn means  that national supervisory authorities must  cooperate which 
implies the creation,  over  a  period of time,  of a  common  supervisory policy, 
i.e.  comparable means  of exercising supervision.  This coordination must  be 
achieved through  a  combination of continuous  close consultation between 
supervisory authorities and directives harmonising essential aspects  of the 
law. 
The  second reason for coordination derives  from the interest of those super-
vised.  The  creation of an  enlarged market,  a  Community  in which borders 
disappear or are at any rate :easily crossed,  an economic  area made  up of the 
territories of nine States  and  in which centralised direction,  integrated 
book-keeping and  uniform cash management  become  feasible,offers banks  and 
insurance  companies  the opportunity to achieve  considerable rationalisation 
of their existing operations as well as the chance to expand.  As  I  am 
speaking in Britain I  should like at this point to say a  particular word 
about British financial institutions.  They  have  a  strong export record 
which has  brought great benefit to this country.  This  achievement  should be 
recognised.  At  the same  time it is right to acknowledge that continental 
Europe  has  not  always  been at the centre of their attention and has  not 
historically been the area of greatest concentration of effort.  But  the 
pattern of UK  trade flows  is changing and financial services cannot  and 
should not  ignore the implications of this shift.  I  am  confident they will 
not and  I  trust in the future,  as the market  for financial services  opens 
up  they will regard this "single" market,  as it is called J.n  Community  jargon 
as  part of the  domestic  market that it will have  become. 
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The  third reason is the benefits to be  derived by customers.  These are 
particularly clear in the insurance field.  We  want to create a  situation 
where  initially large industrial firms  - and then later all other sections of 
the market taking out  insurance - can select  from  the  insurers  offering the 
best terms  in the entire Community.  Bringing about  free  competition  in an 
enlarged market  - an additional aim  - also requires coordination since  such 
competition can take place on  fair terms  only if the different practices of 
the various supervisory authorities  do  not  lead to distortion of competition 
and if those insured enjoy equivalent protection,  no matter where  they take 
out their insurance.....  · 
2.  Method  of coordination 
This  can be  done  through the implementation of two  well-known Community 
principles- "freedom of establishment"  and  "freedom to provide services".  We 
intend to create an enlarged open market  for credit institutions,  insurance 
undertakings,  investment  companies  and stock exchange dealers.  We  intend to 
remove  the obstacles presented by frontiers  and to introduce rules  and 
regulations only where  these are necessary to ensure fair competition and 
investor protection.  We  are therefore basically concerned to satisfy a  demand: 
the demand  from European financial  institutions for simplified procedures 
and broader opportunities.  We  will only introduce  Community  legislation 
where  national laws  have brought about  complex  and inward-looking systems  which 
must  be  opened up and dovetailed into a  Community  system ..•.. 
3.  Coordination of banking law 
After initially - and unsuccessfully-attempting a  comprehensive and far-reaching 
harmonisation of laws,the Commission  switched in 1973  (the year of the accession 
of the United Kingdom,  Denmark  and Ireland)  to a  more  pragmatic  approach.  The 
aim is to integrate banking  systems gradually over a  period of several  years-.-
To  this  end,  the Commission  submitted in 1974 the first general proposal for a 
directive - the First Coordination Directive - which merely outlined the basic 
principles of a  harmonised banking law .••.. 
It represents the first  step in our  plans to harmonise banking law by  stages, 
In particular it contains provisions  on the licensing procedure for credit 
institutions,  and all the Member  States must  either introduce corresponding 
rules  or adapt them where  they already exist.  The  main licensing conditions  are 
the requirementthat companies must  have  sufficient capital (the level and 
composition of which is,  however,  not defined in detail),  and requirements 
concerning proper management,  and legal form  and  similar criteria.  The  new 
banking law planned in the UK,  as  proposed in the White Paper of July 1978,  has 
already adopted the requirements  in the Directive,  so the  Community  Directive 
should pose no  real problems  for the United Kingdom. 
Unfortunately the Directive  says little about  freedom to set up branches any-
where  in the Community.  Our  aim  is that undertakings which have  obtained 
authorisation in one of the Member  States should be free to establish branches 
without further authorisation in all the other States.  The  Directive I  am 
discussing makes  it only slightly easier to establish branches  in other Member 
States and on  this point clearly shows  the need for further coordination  . 
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The  same  is true of continuous  superv1s1on of credit institutions.  Our  first 
Directive merely adheres  to the principle that credit institutions  should be 
supervised on  the basis of solvency and liquidity criteria; the details are 
left open  and are to be determined through cooperation between the  super-
visory authorities.  Our  principle is nevertheless clear:  we  wish to achieve 
a  system in which banks  operating throughout  Europe  remain,  wherever they are 
working,  under the  supervision of their national authorities and  subject to 
home-country rules •.... 
This  brings me  to the question of the next  steps  in our work  in the banking 
sector.  We  have  drawn  up  a  work programme  which for the time being is still 
an internal Commission working  ~ocument, and we  are  consulting all the 
governments  on it.  I  am  in the process  of a  tour of all the Nine  capitals; 
in a  month's  time the top Member  States'  officials responsible for banking will 
meet  in Brussels,  in order to discuss the future work  programme  and its 
priorities ..•.. 
4.  European  Insurance Law 
Here  the Commission's  general approach has been very similar to that in banking: 
the  insurance sector, to a  greater extent than banking is one  where  the 
legislation route is appropriate.  The  Commission  has  however  only made 
proposals after extensive consultation of both the  industry and  government 
authorities concerned ...•.. 
Let me  now  turn to indemnity insurance.  Freedom of establishment here has  been 
largely achieved.  A Directive published as  early as 1973  harmonises  the 
fundamentals  of the system of supervision and thus makes  it easier for  insurance 
undertakings to set up  in several EEC  countries at the  same  time.  Harmonisation 
in particular also covers the fundamental  financial rules,  especially the 
minimum  requirements  for the size of individual companies  own  capital.  The 
great step which has still to be taken is that of the freedom to provide 
services.  Insurance undertakings  from  one  EEC  State must  be able to sell their 
policies across frontiers,  even if they have  set up  no  establishments  in the 
Member  States  concerned .....  . 
We  want  to  extend the freedom to provide  services  in the insurance  sector in 
general.  In the first instance we  must  however  confine ourselves  to major 
risks  such as  transport or  suretyship risks  for  example,  or to especially large 
fire insurance policies.  Especially large or specifically commercial  contracts 
of this kind without  exception involve the participation of insurers who  can 
themselves  assess the security and adequacy of the guarantees offered. 
The  complete  freedom to provide  services which would also enable the man  in 
the street to insure himself abroad against  sickness  costs  for  example or 
private fire  damage,  would require the harmonisation of the laws  on  insurance 
contracts as well as  other changes.  The  first steps  towards measures of this 
kind  are  now  at the discussion stage  in the Commission.  A degree of 
approximation of the basic aspects  of insurance contract law is important tor 
international cover of major risks.  We  need for instance to agree broadly  on 
insurance contract payment  obligations or rights relating to termination and 
so  on.  When  it comes  to the "small"  policy holder,  such points will have to 
be settled in detail.  But for the stage we  have  so far reached,  that of big 
risks, it is sufficient to stipulate a  few  general provisions  and allow the 
parties concerned to choose the law they want  the contract  drawn  in •...... 
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In conclusion I  should like to deal briefly with the problems  of life 
assurance.  Here  our efforts are still at the stage of the freedom of 
establishment,  that is we  are working  on  the approximation of laws which 
should make  it easier for life assurers to open branches  in other Member 
States  in order to offer their services  in the host  country.  Here  coordination 
is mainly concerned with own  capital requirements.  The  aim is for a  :ire 
assurance  company  in an  EEC  country other than its own  to be able to submit  a 
certificate from its national authorities stating that it possesses 
sufficient  solvency in the country in which its head office is situated.  It 
would then not  have to raise new  capital in the host country:  this would 
represent  a  substantial liberalisation but this cannot become  fully effective 
until the many  additional requirements,  for  example those  on the valuation 
of assets,  have  been made  subject to comparable rules. 
One  of the major problems  we  come  up against in this connection is the 
differing structure of insurance undertakings.  Sometimes  these undertakings 
are  "specialised"  and  sometimes  "composite"  insurers,  i.e.  in some  countries 
undertakings  can handle  several or all branches of insurance at the same  time, 
while in other countries the law requires  them to specialise in certain 
branches,  in particular life assurance.  This naturally makes  the integration 
difficult.  But  this is precisely the point  on which  a  compromise  put  forward 
by the United  Kingdomde~ation is in sight.  The  British Government  would be 
willing to accept the following  situation:  insurance  companies  which are 
newly  established would  have to specialise in all the Member  States. 
However,  composite  insurers which already exist now  (such as  the insurance 
companies  in the United Kingdom  and Belgium),  can continue to operate as 
all-purpose undertakings.  But if they move  to a  country where  specialisation 
is compulsory,  they must  comply with this requirement by creating a  separate 
activity for  each of the two  areas  - an independent  subsidiary for the life 
assurance business and a  separate branch for  indemnity insurance.  The 
Commission regards this compromise proposal as very constructive and  supports 
it in the hope that it will provide the basis for the Council's early 
adoption of the life assurance directive ...•. 
* 
*  * 